The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is an extension of the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), in which each player's strategy set may depend on the rival player's strategies. In this paper, we present two descent type methods. The algorithms are based on a reformulation of the generalized Nash equilibrium using Nikaido-Isoda function as unconstrained optimization. We prove that our algorithms are globally convergent and the convergence analysis is not based on conditions guaranteeing that every stationary point of the optimization problem is a solution of the GNEP.
Introduction
The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP for short) is an extension of the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP for short), in which the strategy set of each player depends on the strategies of all the other players as well as on his own strategy. The GNEP has recently attracted much attention due to its applications in various fields like mathematics, computer science, economics, and engineering [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . For more details, we refer the reader to a recent survey paper by Facchinei and Kanzow [3] and the references therein.
Let us first recall the definition of the GNEP. There are players labelled by an integer = 1, . . . , . Each player controls the variables ∈ . Let = ( 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ) be the vector formed by all these decision variables, where := 1 + 2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + . To emphasize the th player variable within the vector , we sometimes write = ( , − ) ∈ , where − denotes all the other player's variables. In the games, each player controls the variables and tries to minimize a cost function ( , − ) subjects to the constraint ( , − ) ∈ with − given as exogenous, where is a common strategy set. A vector * := ( * ,1 , . . . , * , ) is called a solution of the GNEP or a generalized Nash equilibrium, if for each player = 1, . . . , , * , solves the following optimization problem with * ,− being fixed:
If is defined as the Cartesian product of certain sets ∈ , that is, = 1 × 2 × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × , then the GNEP reduces to the standard Nash equilibrium problem.
Throughout this paper, we can make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (a)
The set is nonempty, closed, and convex. (b) The utility function is continuously differentiable and, as a function of alone, convex.
A basic tool for both the theoretical and the numerical solution of (generalized) Nash equilibrium problems is the Nikaido-Isoda function defined as
Sometimes also the name Ky-Fan function can be found in the literature, see [12, 13] . In the following, we state a definition which we have taken from [9] .
Definition 1.
* is a normalized Nash equilibrium of the GNEP, if max Ψ( * , ) = 0 holds, where Ψ( , ) denotes the Nikaido-Isoda function defined as (2) .
In order to overcome the nondifferentiable property of the mapping Ψ( , ), von Heusinger and Kanzow [8] 
Since under the given Assumption 1, Ψ ( , ) is strongly concave in , the maximization problem
has a unique solution for each , denoted by ( ). The corresponding value function is then defined by
Let > > 0 be a given parameter. The corresponding value function is then defined by
Define
In [8] , the following important properties of the function ( ) have been proved. 
From Theorem 2, we know that the normalized Nash equilibrium of the GNEP is precisely the global minima of the smooth unconstrained optimization problem (see [5] ) as
with zero optimal value.
In this paper, we develop two new descent methods for finding a normalized Nash equilibrium of the GNEP by solving the optimization problem (9) . The key to our methods is a strategy for adjusting and when a stationary point of V ( ) is not a solution of the GNEP. We will show that our algorithms are globally convergent to a normalized Nash equilibrium under appropriate assumption on the cost function, which is not stronger than the one considered in [8] .
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we state the main assumption underlying our algorithms and present some examples of the GNEP satisfying it. In Section 3, we derive some useful properties of the function ( ). In Section 4, we formally state our algorithms and prove that they are both globally convergent to a normalized Nash equilibrium.
Main Assumption
In order to construct algorithms and guarantee the convergence of them, we give the following assumption.
Assumption 2. For any
We next consider three examples which satisfy Assumption 2.
Example 3. Let us consider the case in which all the cost functions are separable, that is,
where : → is convex and : − → . A simple calculation shows that, for any ∈ , we have
Hence Assumption 2 holds.
Example 4.
Consider the case where the cost function ( ) is quadratic, that is,
for = 1, . . . , . We have 
Therefore, if the matrix
is positive semidefinite, Assumption 2 is satisfied.
In the following example, we show the relationship between our assumption and the one considered in [8] as follows.
For any > > 0, a given ∈ with ( ) ̸ = ( ), the inequality
holds.
Example 5. Consider the GNEP with = 2 as
and the cost function 1 ( ) = 1 2 and 2 ( ) = − 1 2 .
The point * = (1, 9) is the unique normalized Nash equilibrium. For any ∈ 2 , we have
Therefore Assumption 2 holds, but (16) does not hold for any > > 0.
Properties of ( )

Lemma 6. For any > > 0 and ∈ , we have
Proof. Since ( ) satisfies the optimality condition, then
In a similar way, it follows that ( ) satisfies
Since ( ) as a function of alone is convex, we have Journal of Applied Mathematics respectively. Thus, using the definition of ( ) and (23), we have
Similarly, using the definition of ( ) and (24), we have
The proof is complete. 
Proof. We have from (19) that
By the definition of ( ), we have 2
Since ( ) ∈ , ( ) ∈ and is bounded, we get that lim sup
This completes the proof.
Equation (8) and Assumption 2 yield
where nonnegativity of ( ) follows from the inequalities (23) and (24). In particular, either ( ) is above a tolerance > 0, in which case ( ) − ( ) is a direction of sufficient descent for ( ) at or else, as we show in the lemma below, and is an approximate solution of the GNEP with accuracy depending on , , . This result will lead to our methods.
Lemma 8. For any > > 0 and ∈ , we have
where
Proof. Inequality (32) follows immediately from (19) in Lemma 6. The definition of ( ) implies that
which proves the first inequality in (33). Since ( ) is the sum of the nonnegative quantity
with another nonnegative quantity (see (23) and (24)), we have
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which is the second inequality in (33). This completes the proof.
Two Methods for Solving the GNEP
In this section, we introduce two methods for solving the GNEP, motivated by the D-gap function scheme for solving monotone variational inequalities [14, 15] . We first formally describe our methods below and then analyze their convergence using Lemma 8. 
Apply a descent method to the unconstrained minimization of the function , with as the starting point and using − as a safeguard descent direction at , until the method generates an ∈ satisfying ( ) ≤ . The resulting is denoted by . 
and diam( ) = max , ∈ ‖ − ‖. Since → 0, the first inequality in (39) implies { } is bounded. Moreover, this also implies → 0. 
Choose any continuous function : + → + with ( ) = 0 ⇔ = 0. For = 1, 2, . . ., we iterate the following. Iteration k. Choose any 0 < ≤ (1/2) −1 and then choose ≥ 2 −1 satisfying
Apply a descent method to the unconstrained minimization of the function ( ) with −1 as the starting point. We assume the descent method has the property that the amount of descent achieved at per step is bounded away from zero whenever is bounded and ‖∇ ( )‖ is bounded away from zero. Then, either the method in a finite number of steps generates an x satisfying
which we denote by , or else ( ) must decrease towards zero, in which case any cluster point of solves the GNEP. 
the sequence { } is bounded.
